I’ve spent nearly twenty years working in civic tech.
It feels like with everything going on right now, I should have something to say… This is my attempt to put into words what’s been swirling around in my head during this chaos.
This is my perspective, which I know is just a small part of the picture. In particular, I am focused on the US here, and while I’ve worked with many civic tech nonprofits, journalists, academics, and at commercial civic tech firms, I should note I’ve never been a government employee.
My goal has always been to use technology for positive social change and this is the path that I found. In 2006 that goal led me to Montana to work for Project Vote Smart. Then, in 2007 to the nascent Sunlight Foundation.
The First Wave: ~2005-2016
The Sunlight Foundation would wind up being a key part of the first wave of civic tech.
Sunlight was not the first civic tech organization; it was at least preceded by MySociety in the UK and Josh Tauberer’s govtrack.us in the US, both of which are still going strong, but it did have a tremendous impact. Sunlight’s mission was to “use civic technologies, open data, policy analysis, and journalism to make our government and politics more accountable and transparent to all.”
It was particularly timely, or perhaps trendy. We were building APIs and apps, getting great press, were well-funded and able to build a great team. While a fair bit of our funding came from big tech, we operated without any real interference and were able to do important work on campaign finance, open data, and government accountability & ethics reforms.
This was the beginning of a golden era for civic technology and open data.
In 2009, Obama’s Open Government Directive mandated that agencies publish high value data sets online at known locations.
This was a major win. This open data was a boon to nonprofits, researchers, and businesses that could use the data freely. It also began to prove the case, opening your data was not only the right thing to do, it could create value— the key to getting something done in American politics.
While there were definitely some people within government that were fully on board and instrumental to progress, most of the work was still happening outside of government.
Founded in 2009, Code for America (CfA) was like Sunlight’s younger cousin. Focused on cities, CfA began placing technology fellows within city departments for year-long tours of service. Code for America began to fund its “brigades” in 2012. These were CfA-funded meetup groups of civic technologists looking to do positive work in their cities.1
The CfA brigades, Sunlight’s developer community, and countless other groups thrived on the tremendous energy of the moment. At every event I attended and spoke at, technologists were eager to contribute their time and expertise to build things that actually helped people instead of showing them ads.
The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) was founded in 2011. It presented a rare opportunity for a fresh start; it was the first new Federal agency in the age of the internet. CFPB built an internal technology team that began doing great civic tech work at a rapid pace.
Big changes followed the Healthcare.gov launch fiasco in 2013. 18F was created as an internal technology team for federal agencies. USDS was a direct response created to allow the government to “hire mission-driven professionals into term-limited ’tours of civic service’”, a way for technologists to serve the goals of simplifying outdated tools and streamlining cumbersome processes.
These were enormous wins for civic tech writ large. Civic technologists now had the opportunity to improve access to government services and information from within.
Around this time, many funders of important private sector work, eager to disengage with US politics, started to considering unfurling the “Mission Accomplished” banner and moving on.2
The Crash
With funding starting to decrease, and a political shift happening in the US, 2015 and 2016 saw major upheaval in the civic tech landscape.
Up through 2015, the Sunlight Foundation and Code for America were the titans of the US civic tech space.
By the end of 2016 Sunlight had lost more than half of its staff and had no choice but to give away or shut down their remaining civic tech projects. The same year, Code for America announced it would cease funding the brigades, sending shockwaves through the civic tech community. A handful of other organizations met similar fates at the same time.
Personally, in 2015, after eight years at Sunlight, I resigned as Director of Sunlight Labs. In light of actions taken by the executive director and the board’s lack of response, the vast majority of my colleagues made the same decision.
As much as I loved the work we did and most of the people there, Sunlight had serious internal issues. Multiple managers were abusive towards staff, the worst of it was directed at women I worked with. The fallout from that mismanagement, and continued board inaction, led to the near-total3 collapse of the organization in 2016.
The Second Wave
The second wave began before the first fully crashed, with the professionalization of the civic hackers4 into civic technologists that worked within government, or for the new agile government contractors that sprung up in the aftermath of Healthcare.gov. The exodus of developers from places like Sunlight was a major boon for these teams, but it also spelled the end of well-funded civic-tech work outside government.
And of course, it made some sense for funders to shift focus when they saw government taking up more of the work.
Since then people have come to associate civic tech in the US with the thousands of dedicated technologists working in federal, state, and local government roles.
While this is on the whole, a positive, it is not without issues:
- There is a lot of really valuable work that governments either can not or should not be the ones to fund.
- What if, hypothetically, someone gutted these agencies— disrupting existing civic tech projects within government?5 Or used the hiring authority of places like USDS to bring in dangerously incompetent6 bigots7.
What if working within government means enabling the building of concentration camps?
Unfortunately that is where we are, and many friends and talented public servants are either without work, or soon plan to be.
Towards a Third Wave
I hope most of these civic technologists will find that they can continue their work at the state or local level, but it is likely many will not be able to. In a best-case scenario, civic technologists are going to need to exist outside of government to fill in gaps where they will now exist.
Realistically, there will be a need to build software to help citizens organize and oppose unjust or unlawful government actions.
After all, civic technology is not technology for government, it is technology for people.
I wish I could answer the immediate question of “What can we do right now?” I can’t.
I strongly believe whatever comes next will need to be decentralized but well-organized, focused on building practical tools, with communities at the core. To succeed, the next wave will need to learn from the last twenty years of civic tech, but also plot a new course.
Much of the ineffectiveness of the first wave of civic tech can be attributed to disorganized energy. 2008-2012 saw a ton of developers all building their own version of the same application, and we are still plagued by people building what they think people need instead of actually talking to people. This is the origin of the “build with, not for” mantra that we’d be ill-advised to forget.
Over-centralization left the movement vulnerable as well. A more diverse space would not have felt the same impact of Sunlight’s internal instability, or Code for America’s shift away from funding brigades.
Civic tech can’t be entirely reliant on governments or traditional funders, though I hope some will step up to the plate to help get things off the ground. We will need to be scrappy again; large well-funded teams skew towards complex over-engineered solutions. Civic tech will need to embrace principles of the small web, and small software.
If you have ideas for what comes next, or want to discuss anything, please reach out.
You can connect with me on mastodon or bluesky.
I’m also going to start sharing posts on buttondown, or you can use good old fashioned RSS.
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Chi Hack Night, the longest-running civic tech meetup, both pre-dated the CfA brigades and has also outlived them. ↩︎
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I recall being told in 2015 by a Google.org employee (supporting the development of the Open Civic Data specification) that the order to get out of US politics had come down from the top and they were changing focus. They were not the only funder shifting away from civic tech. ↩︎
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A sliver of the organization existed in name until 2020, but with a fraction of the staff and a drastically diminished reputation. ↩︎
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Civic hacker was the preferred term for much of the first wave, see https://codeforamerica.org/news/what-is-civic-hacking/ ↩︎
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https://apnews.com/article/irs-direct-file-musk-18f-6a4dc35a92f9f29c310721af53f58b16 ↩︎
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https://www.404media.co/anyone-can-push-updates-to-the-doge-gov-website-2/ ↩︎